A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a bid for each object and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium.
Introduction
In the past few decades, it became more and more common that governments used auctions to allocate scarce resources such as spectrum for mobile communication or radio broadcasting, petrol station locations, telephone numbers, etc. Given the official goals of various allocation procedures, governments not always had a "lucky hand" in choosing the right auction design (see, e.g., Klemperer, 2002 , for a review). This paper adds to the list of unfortunate auction designs by analyzing the theoretical properties of an auction which properties were not yet known.
The allocation mechanism we study has been used in practice at least twice. The first time, it was used for allocating licenses for commercial radio stations in The In the two auctions, multiple (possibly heterogeneous) licenses were allocated. If licenses differed, they differed in terms of their coverage (i.e., the number of consumers reached) and as all bidders preferred a larger coverage, all bidders had the same ranking of licenses. Each firm was allowed to acquire at most one license. The auction format was sealed-bid, and firms could express different bids for different licenses. The firms also had to submit a list specifying their respective preferences over the licenses at stake. These preference lists played a role when a firm had submitted highest bids for several licenses. Each winning firm paid its own bid for the license it acquired. This allocation mechanism can be best described as a simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists.
In this paper, we show that this auction format fails to produce one of the most basic and desirable properties of an allocation mechanism, namely that it has an efficient equilibrium. In other words, the licenses do not always end up in the hands of those who value them the most. The reason for this result is as follows. Allocation efficiency requires that all bidders follow the same (symmetric) monotonically increasing (pure) bidding strategy. This implies that if an efficient equilibrium exists, the bidder with the highest possible valuation must submit the highest bids for all objects, and he takes the most preferred one. However, this bidder can potentially increase his expected profit by changing his most preferred object and, at the same time, significantly reducing the bid for that object. In this deviation, the bidder's equilibrium (high) bid for his equilibrium (old) most preferred object remains the highest and, therefore, guarantees him his equilibrium pay-off. The bidder will obtain his equilibrium pay-off if the reduced bid for the 'new' most preferred object is not the highest. However, if the reduced bid turns out to be the highest bid, the bidder obtains his 'new' most preferred object for a very low price.
There are some indications that the outcome of the Dutch allocation mechanism was inefficient. A first indication is that not long after the auction was held, quite a few licenses were resold to third parties. Had the licenses ended up in the hands of those parties that valued them the most, reselling (not long after the auction) should not have taken place.
1 A second indication is that one of the licenses with a specific format requirement (these licenses were auctioned separately from the licenses for unrestricted programming at the same moment in time), was sold for a higher amount than the cheapest license for unrestricted programming (presumably, a more valuable license).
2
This paper relates to a number of areas in the economic literature. First, it relates to the literature on simultaneous pooled auctions (see, e.g., Menezes and Monteiro, 1998) in which, in contrast to the present paper, bidders are only allowed to submit a non-earmarked single bid for one of the objects in the pool. As bidders are uncertain about which object from the pool of objects they are going to win and are only allowed to submit a single bid, bidders may fall pray to some sort of "winner's curse". Salmon and Iachini (2007) experimentally show that bidders often overbid and incur losses because they are forced to buy objects that are not their most preferred objects. In the mechanism analyzed in the present paper, bidders do not suffer from this unexpected loss because they are allowed to submit as many bids as objects. Menezes and Monteiro (1998) show that in the homogeneous private-value case with risk-neutral bidders, simultaneous pooling auctions are revenue-equivalent to a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. This paper also relates to the literature on the so-called 'right-to-choose' auctions.
A right-to-choose auction, which is also referred to as a sequential pooled auction or "condo" auction (as it is being used in selling condominiums in the United States),
consists of a sequence of regular auctions in which bidders bid for the right to choose any object among the objects not yet sold. Burguet (2005) shows that ascending rightto-choose auctions, i.e., right-to-choose auctions that consist of a sequence of regular English auctions, for two ex-ante symmetric objects are efficient. Gale and Hausch (1994) derive the same conclusion for a two-bidder model with more general preferences than in Burguet (2005) . Goeree et al. (2004) introduce bidders' riskaversion into Burguet's (2005) model. They show that ascending right-to-choose auctions raise more revenue than standard simultaneous ascending auctions. Eliaz et al. (2008) examine second-price sealed-bid right-to-choose auctions. They show that in thin markets where there is little interest per object both theoretically and experimentally the second-price sealed-bid right-to-choose auction raises more revenue than sequential auctions for the individual objects. They also provide experimental evidence that a right-to-choose auction can generate even more revenue than a theoretically optimal auction. Moreover, in contrast to the optimal auction, the right-tochoose auction is 'approximately' efficient in the sense that the surplus it generates is close to the maximal one.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the efficiency properties of auctions. Moldovanu and Sela (2003) show that standard auction mechanisms may lead to inefficient allocations if values are strongly interdependent. Janssen and Karamychev (2007) show that even if the externality (interdependence) is weak, efficient equilibria may fail to exist if the bidders' types are strongly ex-ante correlated (affiliated). The present paper, in contrast, shows that simultaneous pooling auctions with multiple bids and preference lists can be inefficient even in the independent private valuation setting.
The paper can also be related to the literature on price dispersion. In Subsection 3.2 we show that even if objects are perfect substitutes, firms bid for them differently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model, which contains the key features of the design of auctions held in The Netherlands and in
Ireland. In Section 3, we look at efficient Nash equilibria of the model and analyze their existence conditions. In particular, Subsection 3.1 analyzes the model with heterogeneous objects, and Subsection 3.2 analyzes the model with homogeneous objects. Section 4 concludes. b in a sealed envelope, one for every object, and states his preference over the two objects in the event that both his bids turn out to be the highest. The preference is expressed in terms of a probability distribution over the two objects and is represented by i p , the probability of taking object 1.
The model
The auctioneer collects all triples ( )
from all bidders and determines the highest bids for every object. If these highest bids belong to different bidders, these 3 The analysis for more than two objects is very similar and for simplicity in notation, we therefore concentrate on the two-object case. 4 We assume linearity for simplicity; a common monotonically increasing scalar function would yield similar conclusions only adding to the notational complexity. 5 If bidders are asymmetric, their types are drawn from different distributions or the ratios of their valuations for the two objects are different. Efficient equilibria do not exist in either one of these cases as efficiency requires that bidding functions for different bidders must be identical (players with higher valuations must bid higher), while asymmetry requires different bidders to use different bidding functions (as the distribution of valuations of a bidder's competitors has an impact on the bidder's equilibrium bidding functions). bidders win the objects for which they are the highest bidders, and they pay their winning bid as a price. If, however, it is one and the same bidder j who has submitted the highest bids for both objects, then this bidder gets object 1 with probability j p and object 2 with probability ( )
. Bidder j pays his bid for the object that he gets. The other object goes to the bidder who has submitted the second highest bid for that object.
This bidder also pays his bid as a price.
Analysis
We will search for efficient Nash equilibria of this game, i.e., equilibria in which the two bidders with the two highest valuations win the objects, and, furthermore, in case 1 < α , the bidder with the highest value wins object 1 (the most valuable object) and the bidder with the second highest value wins object 2. As equilibrium efficiency requires that bidders follow a symmetric monotonically increasing bidding strategy, we focus only on such equilibria. We distinguish two cases.
In Subsection 3.1, we assume that 1 < α so that the objects are heterogeneous. In an efficient monotone symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, each bidder i with valuation b on the other object, a different type of equilibrium may emerge. In a symmetric monotone bidding equilibrium, each bidder i places both his bids on both objects with equal probability, in the spirit of the strategic uncertainty assumption of Crawford and Haller (1990) . If an efficient equilibrium exists, each bidder i sets his preferences for the object on which he submits the lowest bid. As all N bidders place their bids on both objects independently of each other, each of N 2 possible distributions of N 2 bids across two objects occurs with equal probability. This equilibrium can alternatively be viewed as a symmetric mixed-strategy bidding equilibrium.
Heterogeneous objects
We first show that for any 1 < α there is no efficient Nash equilibrium if the number of bidders N is sufficiently large. The intuition is as follows. In an efficient equilibrium, a bidder i with the highest possible valuation 1 = i v submits the highest bid on both objects with certainty and wins object 1, because the equilibrium efficiency requires that
. By significantly reducing his bid on object 2 and making this object his most preferred choice by submitting 0 = i p , he can increase his expected pay-off (due to a higher surplus in the event he is still the highest bidder on object 2), which constitutes a profitable deviation. As the realized profit from such a deviation is strictly positive and independent of the number of bidders N whereas the profit in the proposed efficient equilibrium asymptotically decreases to zero, a larger number of bidders N makes the deviation relatively more profitable. though. He is then still the bidder with the highest bid on object 1, which assures him his equilibrium profit. In addition, with a small probability, he has the highest bid on object 2 as well. In that case he wins object 2 at price γ. Proposition 2. For any 3 ≥ N , there exists a number ( ) ( )
, no pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium exists, so that all Nash equilibria of this game are inefficient.
Proof. Assume that a pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium exists, and let Proof. First, the efficiency criterion requires that every bidder puts his preference on object 1. Second, using a standard technique from auction theory we assume that all bidders i j ≠ follow a symmetric bidding strategy and bid ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
If bidder i bids ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Combining both cases, we can rewrite i π as follows: x , and the maximum must be attained at
, which is the truth-telling condition for the mechanism. The firstorder conditions are:
Solving this system of differential equations yields the following unique candidate bidding functions: . His equilibrium pay-off is
Deviating by bidding
, where ε is arbitrarily small, bidder j has still the highest bid on object 1, but with a small probability he is also the highest bidder for object 2. Stating his preference as 0 = j p yields him in such rare occasions a pay-off of ε α − . Thus, the pay-off j π of bidder j from such a deviation is: 
so that the deviation is profitable.
Hence, an efficient equilibrium does not exist for
In summary, Proposition 3 shows that the non-existence of efficient Nash equilibria is not only an asymptotic property of the game, as established in Proposition 1 and 
Homogeneous objects
In Section 3.1, Proposition 1, we have given a reason why efficient equilibria may not exist in case objects are heterogeneous. In short, when all bidders submit their high bids on object 1 with equal probability. 6 In other words, bidders put their (deterministic) bids randomly on both objects. In order to get the highest possible expected surplus, every bidder will set his preferences for the object on which he submits the lowest bid.
In the following proposition, we show that in case objects are homogeneous no efficient Nash equilibria exist.
Proposition 4. The auction with homogeneous objects has no efficient symmetric Nash equilibria.
Proof. Suppose an efficient Nash equilibrium does exist, and let its monotone and symmetric bidding functions be ( ) 
, then there is a positive probability that all bidders' valuations will be drawn from Θ in such a way that
and ( ) ( ) In such a case, bidder 1 takes object 1 (as ( )
is the highest overall bid and bidder 1's low bid on object 2 does not turn out to be the highest bid on object 2) and bidder 3 takes object 2 (as ( ) ( ) Bidding behavior of a bidder with a value close to zero can be described as follows.
The probability that he outbids two competitors is negligibly small compared to outbidding only one. Therefore, his bidding strategy is based on out-competing only one bidder. Consequently the auction game for a low-valuation bidder is like a singleobject first-price sealed-bid auction with one competitor, where bidding half of his value is an equilibrium strategy. increases, then this probability increases too. The intuition is twofold. First, if more than three bidders compete, then more than one bidder can outbid the second highest valuation bidder on one of the objects, and, second, the expected difference between the low bid of the second highest valuation bidder and the high bid of the lower valuation bidders is smaller. On the other hand, the expected efficiency loss goes down when the number of bidders increases.
Concluding remarks
This paper shows that simultaneous pooled auctions with multiple bids and preference lists, where single-object demand bidders are allowed to make separate bids for each object and submit a preference list to rank these objects, never have efficient equilibria unless objects are sufficiently heterogeneous. In so far, as efficiency of auctions'
outcome is an important consideration for governments -and which government would ever want to openly deny that this is the case? -the paper shows that this type of auction format, i.e., a multi-object sealed-bid auction with right-to-choose ingredients,
should not be used (anymore). Other mechanisms exist that exhibit these efficiency properties (under fairly general conditions), like the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, 8 the simultaneous ascending auction, 9 and the right-to-choose auction. In laboratory experiments, Goeree et al. (2006) show that with respect to efficiency, the simultaneous ascending auction performs better than auctions with a first-price element like the simultaneous first-price auction, the sequential first-price auction and the simultaneous descending auction. As other auction formats perform better, we do not see good economic arguments why the auctions analyzed in this paper should be used in future allocation processes.
